Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Popular Media

Faculty Scholarship

9-1-2020

Circuit Split Deepened by Second Circuit's 'Functional' Test
Application in Recent Section 1782 Ruling
Peter B. Rutledge
University of Georgia Law School, borut@uga.edu

Emina Sadic Herzberger
University of Georgia Law School, ESHerzberger@uga.edu

Repository Citation
Rutledge, Peter B. and Herzberger, Emina Sadic, "Circuit Split Deepened by Second Circuit's 'Functional'
Test Application in Recent Section 1782 Ruling" (2020). Popular Media. 324.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_pm/324

This News Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @
University of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Popular Media by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited
from this access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Circuit Split Deepened by Second Circuit's 'Functional' Test Application in Recent
Section 1782 Ruling
By Peter B. "Bo" Rutledge and Emina Sadic Herzberger.
September 1, 2020
Daily Report Online

Federal law authorizes district courts to order discovery for use in a proceeding before a "foreign or
international tribunal." While that law, 28 U.S.C. § 1782, permits interested persons to request such discovery,
neither the statutory language nor Supreme Court jurisprudence definitively resolves whether private arbitral
tribunals fall within its scope. Unsurprisingly, the lack of clear guidance on this matter has triggered a circuit
split, with the Second and Fifth Circuits generally declining to extend § 1782 to private arbitral tribunals while
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits broadly interpret the statutory language to apply § 1782 to private arbitral
tribunals. In the Eleventh Circuit, the doctrine is in flux.
A recent Second Circuit decision, In re Guo, has exacerbated this inter-circuit disagreement. Guo held that the
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration (CIETAC) falls outside the scope of § 1782 because it is a
private arbitral body, thereby affirming prior circuit precedent. However, the Second Circuit's reasoning has
evolved because Guo employed a "functional analysis test," descriptively similar to (though substantively
different from) a test employed in the Eleventh Circuit. Guo's reasoning will inform future litigation over § 1782
requests for use in private arbitral tribunals and whether, under the functional analysis, tribunals formed
pursuant to bilateral investment treaties warrant a different outcome.
Current discussion of § 1782 begins with the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Intel v. Advanced Micro
Devices. Intel held that the European Commission constituted a tribunal under § 1782 when it acts as a firstinstance decisionmaker in its functioning. The court found that a district court may order production of
documents for use in a "foreign or international tribunal" but did not explicitly include private arbitral tribunals
within § 1782's scope.
Federal circuits split over whether private arbitration tribunals fall under Section 1782's scope. A series of preIntel precedents held that they did not. In 1999, the Second Circuit decided National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v.
Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. (NBC), finding that in light of § 1782's legislative history, the statute only extends to
entities that act as state instrumentalities or with the state's authority. Soon after, the Fifth Circuit also found
that private arbitral tribunals did not fall under § 1782 in Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International.
In Intel's wake, both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that § 1782 applies to private arbitral tribunals. In
In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings (AJL) the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the
statutory text and context in which § 1782 was drafted allows for the inclusion of private commercial arbitral

tribunals. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co. reasoned that Congress did not intend
narrowly read 'tribunal'.
Currently, the Eleventh Circuit does not have a binding appellate decision on point. In 2012, it found that §
1782 applies to private arbitral tribunals in In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. Employing
a "functional analysis" (though one clearly different from the Second Circuit's), the Eleventh Circuit asks
whether the tribunal 1) acts as a first-instance adjudicative decision-maker, 2) permits the gathering and
submission of evidence, 3) has the authority to determine liability and impose penalties, and 4) issues
decisions subject to judicial review. The court, however, vacated its opinion in 2014, thereby declining to
answer what constitutes a foreign tribunal and leaving "the resolution of the matter for another day." Without a
binding appellate decision on this point, district courts within the circuit remain divided over the point.
Guo resuscitates issues left on the table after Consorcio. Interestingly, while Guo like Consorcio purported to
apply a functional analysis, it reached a directly contrary conclusion on whether a private international tribunal
fell within the ambit of § 1782. Guo's "functional" approach examines the entity's degree of state affiliation,
functional independence possessed by the entity, and degree to which the parties' contract controls the panel's
jurisdiction—in short, whether the entity's functional attributes are "most commonly associated with private
arbitration." Applying those factors, the Second Circuit found that CIETAC "functions essentially independently"
from China, that Chinese courts play a limited role over review of arbitrations and that CIETAC's jurisdiction
derives entirely from the parties' contract, not the Chinese State.
Guo's reaffirmation of its pre-Intel precedent and its invocation of one functional approach raise three
questions.
First, any functional analysis creates the odd spectacle of putting the private arbitral institution under a judicial
microscope. While their factors differ, both the Guo and the Consorcio tests partly turn on fact-based issues of
institutional design. The irony cannot be lost when one steps back to consider that a key purpose of the
international arbitral system was to keep disputes out of court. Moreover, the very undertaking required by the
functional approach is fraught: Generally, arbitral institutions enjoy an absolute immunity from suit (and
process) in federal and state court. Consequently, not only is it odd to see the institution under the judicial
microscope, common-law immunity virtually ensures that judicial examination will be at best incomplete and at
worst inaccurate.
Second, Guo leaves open the possibility of a different result in cases before investment and trade tribunals.
Under the Guo analysis, unlike private arbitration tribunals, such entities often derive their authority not from
the parties' contract but, rather, from bilateral and multilateral treaties. At the same time, under the Consorcio
analysis, they share some common attributes with private tribunals such as the ability to determine liability.
Some early § 1782 jurisprudence, particularly In re Oxus Gold (from a District Court in New Jersey), sketched
out this possibility. Guo suggests that the Second Circuit might be headed in this direction.

Finally, this circuit split encourages forum shopping in § 1782 proceedings. Identically situated parties seeking
discovery in support of arbitration before the same private tribunal will receive different receptions in the
Second and Fifth Circuits than in the Sixth and Fourth Circuits. Litigants before the Eleventh Circuit and
elsewhere will be writing on a blank jurisprudential slate. One hopes that Supreme Court intervention will clean
up this increasingly messy and important area of international arbitration law.
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